Given the increasing dependence of our societies on information systems, the overall security of these systems should be measured and improved. 
Introduction
Our society has become increasingly dependant on the reliability and proper functioning of a vast number of interconnected information systems. To secure such systems, it is necessary to measure the amount of security provided by various network configurations, such as topology, connectivity and services ("you cannot improve what you cannot measure" [8] ). The aim of our research is to develop coherent, logical and applicable security metrics for computer networks.
In network security, there exists considerable research and standard techniques for measuring individual vulnerabilities, such as the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS). Clearly, this is an important step in network security evaluation.
However, by considering vulnerabilities on an individual basis, a network security administrator could be misled in a situation where individual vulnerabilities scores are low but these vulnerabilities could be combined to compromise a critical resource. More recent research has started to examine quantitative measurements. One interesting research direction is the use of Attack Graphs (AGs) to model the security state of a network. Recently, a probabilistic network security metric based on AGs has been developed [6] . This proposal makes use of AG models to define the notion of a probabilistic network security metric. However, the research to date still combines individual scores in an arbitrary way. They cannot handle situations where the exploitation of a vulnerability affects the likelihood of exploiting another vulnerability. These past approaches usually assume independently distributed likelihood scores.
In this paper, we propose to explore the use of Bayesian Networks (BNs) to model the security states of networks and encode the probabilistic properties of the network vulnerabilities. Through modeling AGs as special BNs, we provide a sound theoretic foundation for developing probabilistic metrics. In addition, our BN model provides an effective approach for handling cases where the vulnerability exploitation scores are not independent and cannot be addressed by previous approaches. We bind our model to the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) [4] standard to make it more applicable.
The organization of the rest of this paper is as follows. Section 2 reviews related work. Section 3 presents the notion of AGs and BNs. Section 4 models network security states as BNs. We then examine the foundation of combining network vulnerability scores based on AGs represented as BNs.
Section 5 concludes the paper and discusses future work.
Related Works
The idea of using BNs to model network vulnerabilities and determine a quantitative value representing the security of the network was first mentioned by Liu and Man [1] . A BN is used to model all potential atomic attack steps in a network. Each node represents a single security property violation state and each edge corresponds to an exploitation of one or more exhibited vulnerabilities. They assign edge weights to represent the probability of successful exploits. The difference between their work and ours will be detailed in Section 3.
Noel et al. [2] uses AGs generated with the tool Topographical Vulnerability Analysis (TVA) . They also propose a mechanism to quantify the security of the network by calculating the combined effect of all of the vulnerabilities present in the network. They propose assigning weights to each node representing the likelihood that the vulnerability may be exploited. It is proposed that such a measure could be taken from CVSS. By calculating the probability values from the initial conditions through to the goal state, a quantitative measure of the combined effects of the vulnerabilities for the network is available.
Wang et al. [3] proposed the concept of using combining functions to determine the combined effect of vulnerabilities in a network. They proposed the idea of using an analogy to the resistance of electrical circuits for which known mathematical calculations exist. Finally, Islam et al. [6] proposed a probabilistic network security metric based on AGs. They proposed the use of probability scores for each vulnerability to represent the likelihood that one attacker or the percentage of attackers that will exploit the vulnerability. They also addressed the issue of how to effectively eliminate cycles in the AG without the loss of integrity. This is important because by definition, BNs are directed acyclic graphs (DAG). In [9] , Peng et al. discuss the use of BN theory to make decisions regarding the elimination of cycles.
Preliminaries
To be self-contained, this section reviews the AG model and BNs.
Attack Graph Model
AGs model our knowledge about how multiple vulnerabilities may be combined for an attack. The model represents system states using a collection of security-related conditions, such as the existence of vulnerabilities on a particular host or the connectivity between different hosts. The exploit of an existing vulnerability is modeled as a transition between the system states. As the number of such attack sequences is potentially exponential, an improved representation is proposed to encode only the inter-dependency relationship between exploits and conditions, leaving actual attack sequences implicit. This graph-based representation has a polynomial size in the total number of exploits and conditions. In our approach, we use such a representation for AGs generated through TVA. Figure 1 shows an example of a network configuration shown on the left-hand side, and the corresponding AG on the right-hand side. The file server offers the file transfer protocol (ftp) service, the secure shell (ssh) service, and the remote shell (rsh) service. The database server offers the ftp and rsh services. The firewall allows ftp, ssh, and rsh traffic from a user workstation to both servers, and blocks all other traffic. In the AG, exploits of vulnerabilities are depicted as predicates in ovals and conditions as predicates in rectangles. The two numbers inside parentheses denote the source and destination host, respectively. The attacker's initial capability is shown in a triangle and the goal condition in an octagon. In the AG we can observe these attack paths, the meaning of which are self-explanatory:
1.
Block rsh Block ssh
Bayesian Networks
BNs can be defined as DAGs with nodes representing variables and arcs representing conditional independencies among the variables. From [10] , a BN for a system X can be formally described as a pair B=(G,Q) where G is a DAG in which the nodes represent the variables of the system and the arcs represent the conditional relationships among the variables. Q is the set of parameters that quantify the network such as the conditional distribution values for each variable (nodes). The joint distribution for a BN is represented by:
BNs offer a compact means to encode the entire range of conditional relationships in the system being modeled. In [6] , the notion of assigning to each node of an AG a probability value that represents the likelihood that one attacker or the percentage of attackers that will exploit the vulnerability was discussed. In our work, we will use the same AG annotated with the individual probabilities and then develop the Conditional Probability Tables (CPT) for each node of the AG. As discussed earlier, the AG, which can always be represented as a DAG coupled with the CPT, encoding the conditional independencies for all nodes will constitute a BN.
It is important to distinguish our attack graph from that of Liu et al. Our AG is generated using tools such as the TVA tool. Liu et al. represent each node of the graph as a host with a specific security violation state, whereas in our AGs, each node represents vulnerabilities as well as the pre and post conditions resulting from the exploitation of such vulnerabilities. Liu et al. also propose a security matrix from which they derive a probability value assigned as an edge weight. It is important to note that Liu et al. assign probabilities to the edges. We believe that this is not as practical as our approach of using probabilities for nodes, which can be readily obtained from standard measures widely available such as CVSS.
Our work will also expand upon the basic model of AGs using BNs in order to resolve some issues which arise in AG modeling such as the dependencies which may arise when the order in which exploits is significant. Our model proposes the use of CVSS mechanisms to populate the AG which is in our opinion a means to ensuring that consistent data is used and that the research community will be able to have confidence in the results produced by our model.
Modeling Attack Graphs and Security Metrics Using Bayesian Networks
This section proposes our approach to combining AG results with BN principals. The goal is to develop mechanisms to determine quantitative values representing the overall network security when considering the combined effect of all known vulnerabilities of a system. This quantitative value will serve as a security metric for measuring the overall security of the network.
Basic Building Blocks
First we will introduce 2 basic building blocks to our approach. In case 1, we have a vulnerability "A" providing the preconditions to exploiting vulnerability "B" and the successful exploitation of both vulnerabilities, leads us to the goal state which is the post-condition of vulnerability "B".
Case 1: To reach the goal state, vulnerabilities A and B most both be exploited
In this AG, each node has been annotated with a probabilistic score. As we have already mentioned, our model proposes the use of the scoring mechanisms provided in CVSS to derive these probabilistic scores. Next we generate the CPT for each node. These tables encode the probability value of each node and its conditional dependencies. In this model, the nodes are assigned discrete values of "T" signifying that the exploit has been successfully performed by the attacker or "F" indicating that the exploit has not been successfully performed.
The CPT (Figure 3 ) will allow us to calculate the joint probability function for the given network. As previously stated, we are interested in determining the probability of achieving the goal state which in this case is the probability that B="T" (vulnerability B has been exploited). This can be calculated as follows: It is interesting to note that the probabilistic score of case 2 is greater than that for case 1. This satisfies the intuitive property whereby a security metric should satisfy the concept that as more paths to a goal state exist, the security of the network decreases. Thus this simple example validates this notion and the use of the probabilistic score as a security metric.
Case 3: To Reach the Goal State, both A and B must first be exploited and then C Obviously, the probability of achieving the goal state is significantly less than in case 1 and 2 which again makes sense intuitively as this graph restricts the number of potential attackers that can achieve the preconditions required to exploit C. In case 2, the number of attackers capable of achieving the preconditions was A "or" B whereas in case 3, the number of attackers is A "and" B.
We will now consider a particular situation based on case 2. In case 2, exploits A and B are mutually independent whereas in case 4, we show the effects when the likelihood of exploit B is dependant on the exploitation of vulnerability A. This could be the case where an attacker has gained knowledge following the successful exploit of A that could allow him to more easily exploit vulnerability B. In Case 4, the likelihood of successfully exploiting vulnerability B without prior exploitation of vulnerability A is evaluated at 0.3 (same as case 2). However, assume that following the successful exploitation of A, the attacker has gained 
knowledge and skills that increase the likelihood of exploiting B to 0.5.
Case 4: Successful exploitation of A increases likelihood of exploiting B (Disjunctive relationship)
The probability of achieving the goal state is the same as in Case 2. An interpretation of this result is: In order to exploit C we must have either a successful exploitation of A or B. In the event A is successfully exploited, the likelihood of B increases. However, the attacker can go directly to the attack phase on C without attempting to exploit B (in which case the adjusted score makes no difference) which is the same as in case 2. In the event that only B is successfully exploited, then A is not exploited. This results in the attacker being able to proceed to attack C and the score of exploit B remains unchanged. This case is the same as case 2. Note that the result will always be the conjunction of the likelihood of A with the adjusted likelihood score for B. This is due to the fact that A must be exploited which in turn means that B will always have a likelihood equal to the adjusted value if C is exploited.
Application of Bayesian Attack Graphs
We will show how our model can handle some interesting cases. Consider the two AGs in Figure 12 . In the graph on the left, an attacker must: exploit A or B, and C, and D to achieve the goal state. The graph on the right differs slightly. In order to achieve the goal state, an attacker must execute the same steps as that to the left. However, if the attacker exploits A, he acquires knowledge that will make exploiting D easier and more likely. This is denoted by the likelihood score of 0.4 (when A is not exploited to reach D) and 0.8 (when A has been exploited to reach D). This is modelled by the CPT below. The probability score for reaching the goal state can be calculated with BN inference. This probability score represents the overall security metric for the network being analysed. Notice in the CPT for the right side graph that exploiting A implies that exploiting D will be more likely, however, C must still be exploited.
The probability scores for attaining the goal states in each graph are: Left: 0.0816 and Right: 0.1296. These security metric scores show that the likelihood of attaining the goal state on the right side graph is greater than that of the left.
Conclusion and Future Work
This paper shows how BNs can be used with AGs as a tool for calculating security metrics regarding information system networks. The use of our Bayesian AG model with the mechanisms from CVSS is in our opinion an effective and sound methodology contributing towards improving the research into the development of security metrics. We will continue to refine our approach using Dynamic Bayesian Networks to encompass the Temporal domain measurements established in the CVSS. 
